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AN IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER
TITLE VI
Although the statute does not explicitly provide for a private right of
action, private plaintiffs have employed Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 (Title VI) to remedy a wide variety of discriminatory practices which
disadvantage ethnic and racial minorities.2 The Supreme Court has not
expressly decided whether a private right of action may be implied under
Title VI. The lower federal courts, however, generally allow private suits
as a necessary tool for enforcement of the statute. 3 In implying these pri-
vate rights of action, courts also face the secondary issue of whether Title
VI prohibits only intentional discrimination, or also forbids facially neutral
practices which have a discriminatory impact.!
Section 601 of Title VI forbids any program or activity receiving federal
funds from discriminating on the basis of race, color or national origin.5
Congress has created two methods to enforce section 601. Each agency
granting federal funds is'empowered under Title VI to issue implementing
rules and regulations.' This method seeks voluntary compliance by fund
recipients and allows an aggrieved party to complain t6 the appropriate
federal department or agency. If attempts to secure voluntary compliance
fail, the agency then may terminate program funding.
7
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d - 2000d-4 (1976).
2 Plaintiffs have relied on Title VI to obtain relief from employment discrimination
where the federal funds specifically created the jobs. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1287 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Furthermore, plaintiffs may seek relief from
educational discrimination through Title VI. For example, in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974), Chinese-speaking school children brought a Title VI suit against San Francisco school
district. The school district required proficiency in English for graduation from high school,
but did not provide remedial English classes for 1800 non-English speaking students. Id. at
565-66. The Court ordered the school district, which had contractually agreed to comply with
Title VI, to fashion appropriate relief for the students. Id. at 568-69. In an unusual Title VI
case, a black plaintiff employed Title VI to obtain admission to an all-white country club
built with proceeds from a federal loan. See Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, Inc.,
341 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (E.D. Va. 1972).
See, e.g., Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 911 (1967); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1146 (W.D.
Tex. 1972).
See text accompanying notes 72-87 infra.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). The statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color or national origin, he excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). Presently, 27 agencies have promulgated regulations imple-
menting Title VI. See Lamber, Private Causes of Action under Federal Agency Nondiscrimi-
nation Statutes, 10 CoNN. L. Rav. 859, 859 n.3 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lamber].
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). Before a fund termination, the agency must comply with
certain procedural safeguards. The safeguards an agency must follow after efforts to secure
voluntary compliance have failed include an opportunity for hearing and an express finding
of non-compliance on the record. Id. In addition, the head of the federal department or agency
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Although fund termination serves as a deterrent to the offenders, mone-
tary cut-offs often may leave the injured party without a remedy, because
fund termination may eliminate entirely the benefit sought by the victim
of discrimination.8 Courts, therefore, have allowed aggrieved parties to sue
directly under Title VI, which does not expressly provide a direct cause of
action. Although some lower courts have explicitly decided the issue of
implication of a private right of action,' most courts address the merits of
a Title VI case,, bypassing the initial determination of a plaintiff's statu-
tory right to bring his action."0 The Supreme Court has never ruled directly
on whether the right exists, despite twice allowing private plaintiffs to
recover under the statute."
One of the leading cases to address the Title VI private right of action
issue was Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon." The Bossier Parish
School Board denied to black children of parents stationed on a nearby Air
Force base the right to attend the local high school.' 3 The children sued to
enforce a contractual agreement between the government and the school
board allowing the children to be admitted to school in accordance with
Louisiana law." The Fifth Circuit viewed section 601's prohibition against
must first file a written report with the congressional committees having legislative jurisdic-
tion over the activity involved and allow 30 days before terminating the funds. A cut-off of
funds is used only as a last resort. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1969
(1979) (White, J. dissenting); 110 CONG. REc. 6546 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 110
CONG. REc. 6749 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Moss).
8 See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1284 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
1 See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). But see Clark
v. Louisa County School Bd., 472 F. Supp. 321, 323 (E.D. Va. 1979).
,1 See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974); Pabon v.
Levine, 70 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., Bd. of Trustees, 386 F.
Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.
1967); Lemon v. Bossier School Bd., 240 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. La. 1965), aff'd 370 F.2d 847
(5th Cir. 1967).
" The Supreme Court allowed private plaintiffs to recover under Title VI in Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), see note 2 supra, and in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978). The plaintiff in Bakke challenged the special admissions program of the
Medical School of the University of California at Davis. Id. at 269. The Davis program
allowed members of minority groups to compete for all 100 openings in the first year class,
while restricting white applicants to only 84 openings. Id. at 289. Although Bakke was ulti-
mately decided on Title VI grounds, the Court assumed the existence of a private right of
action for purposes of the case and did not expressly decide whether the plaintiff was entitled
to bring the action. The issue was neither argued nor decided in the lower courts, and was,
therefore, not properly before the Court. Id. at 283. Bakke was decided by a divided court,
with only four justices willing to state categorically that a Title VI private right of action
exists. Id. at 420-21 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice White adamantly denied
its existence. Id. at 380-87 (White, J., dissenting).
12 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967).
,3 Id. at 850.
" Under the terms of the contract, the school district agreed to allow the children of Air
Force parents to attend the local schools. The Bossier court viewed the school district's
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TITLE VI
discrimination as a condition which the government attached to the fund-
granting contract and which it may enforce by terminating the funding.'5
The court concluded that, because Title VI provides aggrieved individuals
no statutory remedy, the c6urts may take cognizance of their claims.',
The Supreme Court first granted relief in a private enforcement action
under Title VI in Lau v. Nichols.7 Lau was a class action involving 1800
Chinese-speaking San Francisco children denied a right to equal education
by a requirement of proficiency in the English language with no attendant
remedial instruction." The Court granted relief on the merits of the case
without addressing the private right of action issue." Language in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion, however, gave rise to speculation whether
Title VI relief would be granted only to substantial numbers of litigants
or whether individual plaintiffs might also obtain relief."0
Two years later in Regents of University of California v. Bakke,2 the
Supreme Court allowed an individual plaintiff to recover under Title VI.
Plaintiff Bakke challenged a university admissions system which effec-
tively established minority quotas.2 Ordering the plaintiff be admitted to
medical school, the Court held that a university may consider race as a
factor in selecting among university applicants,2 but may not use a quota
system."
Bakke did not decide whether a private tight of action might be im-
acceptance of federal funds as a ratification of the contract and as an obligation to comply
with section 601 by providing education without racial discrimination. Id. at 851.
11 The Bossier court held that once the parish accepted federal funds, it could not deny
the plaintiffs their right to attend school. Id.
", Id. at 852. Bossier subsequently has been cited as squarely deciding the private right
of action question. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1957 (1979).
1 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
,S Id. at 566. California law required full-time compulsory education for children between
the ages of six and sixteen years. Id. Although English was the mandatory basic language in
all California schools, and proficiency in English was a prerequisite for a diploma of gradua-
tion, only 1,707 of 3,457 Chinese students needing remedial English instruction were receiving
it. Id. at 564-66. The result was that 1800 students were receiving incomprehensible and
meaningless classroom instruction. Id. at 566.
" Id. at 569.
20 Id. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun raised the question of whether
the relief in Lau would have been granted had there been only a few children affected. Id;
see Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974) (Title VI violation
exists only where substantial group deprived).
21 438 U.S. 265 (1978), see note 11 supra.
2 438 U.S. at 269, see note 11 supra.
2 Id. at 323.
24 Id. at 289-305. Six opinions were filed in the case. Four Justices (Justices Stevens,
Stewart, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger) agreed with Justice Powell that plaintiff Bakke
should be admitted. Id. at 271. The remaining four Justices would deny Bakke admission,
but agreed with Justice Powell that race may be considered in admissions decisions. Id. at
272. Commentators have not hailed Bakke as a model of clarity for judicial opinion writing.
See generally Symposium: Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 67 CAUF. L. Rzv. 1
(1979); Bakke Symposium: Civil Rights Perspectives, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 1 (1979).
19801
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plied because the issue was not properly before the Court."8 Justice Ste-
vens, in a concurring opinion joined by three other justices, concluded that
implication would be proper.Y The concurrence based its conclusion on an
analysis of the Cort v. Ash test."
The Cort v. Ash test consists of four factors to aid courts in determining
whether Congress intended to enforce a statute through a private right of
action." The first inquiry is whether the statute was enacted for the benefit
of a special class of which the plaintiff is a member.2 Where the language
of the statute explicitly confers a right or duty on a class of persons, the
Supreme Court generally has endorsed the propriety of implying a private
right of action. 1 Justice Stevens concluded that the language of Title VI
2 438 U.S. at 269.
26 Id. at 283; see note 11 supra.
27 Id. at 408-421 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting).
25 Id. at 420 n.28; see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For an exhaustive analysis of Title
VI under Cort v. Ash, see Lamber, supra note 6. Prior to the Cort decision, the Supreme Court
had upheld the implication of private causes of action in extremely limited sets of circumstan-
ces. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1975 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Under the Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-161 (1976), and the Railway Labor
Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976), the Court looked to the unavailability of other means
of enforcement as a circumstance calling for a private right of action. See Tunstall v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944) (prohibition against union discrimina-
tion); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n, 300 U.S. 515, 548-50 (1937) (enforcement of collective
bargaining); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 42 (1916) (tort action). The Supreme
Court had also allowed private remedies under several other federal statutes. See Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9-10 (1971) (SEC Rule 10b-5); Allen v. State Bd. of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 554-57 (1969) (preclearance provisions of §5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413-17 (1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982). Since
Cort v. Ash, however, the courts of appeals have implied private rights of action in numerous
areas. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1980 (1979) (Title IX).
Justice Powell has questioned the constitutionality of implying a private right of action.
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946, 1975-85 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
Powell feels such implication cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of separation of powers.
Congress alone determines the jurisdiction of courts created under Article III of the Constitu-
tion. Therefore, according to Justice Powell, Congress alone should determine when private
parties are allowed causes of action. Justice Powell reasons that federal courts should not
enlarge their jurisdiction by creating such a remedy. Id. at 1981. Justice Powell would reject
the Cort v. Ash analysis entirely and imply a right of action only if very compelling evidence
of congressional intent exists. Id. at 1980-81. He constantly urges the Court to stop assuming
legislative functions and resolve all doubts against implication, regardless of the temptation
in an appealing case to provide relief where none has been provided by Congress. See also
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979). Although
Transamerica limits application of the Cort analysis in implying private rights of action, id.
at 245-49, it does not appear to affect Titles IX or VI.
" Cart v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78.
30 Id.
"' See note 28 supra. The conclusion that Title VI explicitly confers a specific benefit was
not questioned in Bakke, nor in subsequent cases. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc.,
599 F.2d 1247, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1979). See generally, note, Implied Rights of Action to Enforce
Civil Rights: The Case for a Sympathetic View, 87 YALE L.J. 1378 (1978).
TITLE VI
confers a benefit on victims of racial discrimination.2
The second consideration under the Cort v. Ash analysis is whether
Congress explicitly or implicitly intended to create or deny a private rem-
edy.3 In statutes such as Title VI where the law clearly grants certain
rights to a class of persons, an explicit intent to create a private right of
action need not be shown.34 An express intent to deny a private cause of
action, however, would be fatal to implication.3 Justice Stevens concluded
that the legislative history of Title VI, examined as a whole, indicated that
Congress did not intend to deny a private right of action.'6
The next judicial inquiry is whether the private remedy would frustrate
the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. 37 Justice Stevens argued
that Title VI involved personal rights and was drafted for a remedial pur-
pose which would be severely hampered without a private remedy to com-
plement the agency procedures.3 Justice White dissented, contending that
Congress intended the statute to be enforced only through the administra-
tive process or pre-existing statutory means. 39 Justice White stated that
section 601's procedural safeguards" indicated that Congress did not in-
tend to allow a private party to circumvent the administrative process.'
In addition, the dissenting Justice felt that inclusion of explicit provisions
for private rights of action in Titles Hl4 and VIH1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 precluded implying such a right under Title VI."
The final consideration under the Cort v. Ash analysis is whether the
subject matter in issue is traditionally a state concern." Justice Stevens
concluded that Title VI obviously was not an exclusive state concern, since
Title VI's rights are federally created and the expenditure of federal funds
justifies the prohibition against using such funds to further racial discrimi-
nation.4 6
,2 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 420 n.28 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting).
3 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
11 Id. at 82.
5 Id.
3, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 420 n.28 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting). The Bakke dissent disagreed with Justice Stevens and contended that the
legislative history did evince an explicit intention to foreclose implication. Id. at 381-82
(White, J., dissenting).
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 420 n.28 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting).
3, Id. at 381-83 (White, J., dissenting); see note 7 supra.
" See note 7 supra.
" Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 383 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(d) (1976); see note 62 infra.
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) & 2000e-16(c) (1976); see note 62 infra.
" Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 381 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).
'3 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
" Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 420-21 n.28 (Stevens, J., concurring
and dissenting). Like the conclusion that Title VI confers a benefit on a special class, see note
19801
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The Bakke decision did not settle the Title VI private right of action
issue. Lower courts have continued to differ on the propriety of implying
a private right of action with each side citing appropriate sections of the
Bakke opinion for support. One of the leading cases denying a private right
was NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,47 a class action seeking
to block construction of a suburban medical center." The opponents of the
center contended that black, elderly, Hispanic, and handicapped citizens
would be unable to reach the new facility and would be forced to use the
inner city hospital." The Wilmington court viewed the elaborate and care-
fully constructed enforcement mechanism of Title VIII as manifest evi-
dence that Title VI is essentially an administrative program.51 The court
concluded that the rights of aggrieved parties would be adequately pro-
tected by the provisions for judicial review of agency action.52
Eschewing the Cort v. Ash analysis, the Third Circuit set forth three
arguments against implying a private right of action under Title VI. First,
the court reasoned that implication would violate the evident congres-
sional intent to vest initial adjudication of Title VI claims in the appropri-
ate administrative agency. 3 In addition, implication of a private right of
action would expand the remedies already explicitly provided by the stat-
ute.-" Finally, the Wilmington court reasoned that implication might allow
a court to substitute its discretion for an administrative agency's decision
and thereby undermine the agency function.55
32 supra, the conclusion that Title VI is not an exclusive state concern has not been ques-
tioned since Bakke. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1257-58 (3d Cir. 1979).
11 453 F. Supp. 280 (D.Del. 1978), rev'd sub nom. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc. 599
F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 289-90.
" Id. Pursuant to court order, the Secretary of HEW had negotiated a voluntary compli-
ance plan with the hospital to lessen the discriminatory impact. Id. at 290. The plaintiffs,
dissatisfied with the proposed plan, filed the instant suit to secure a trial de novo rather than
judicial review as required by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2. 453 F. Supp. at 291.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (§ 602 of Title VI); see note 7 supra.
51 453 F. Supp. at 294-95. The Wilmington court saw its function as assuring that the
agency construed its statutory obligations properly and consistently, rather than resolving
particular questions of compliance or non-compliance. Id. at 295.
11 Id. The court noted that an aggrieved party may seek judicial review to challenge the
failure or refusal of federal officials to terminate funding to programs that purportedly engage
in discrimination. Id.
" Id. at 301-02. Representative Gill noted that section 602 does not contain a right of
legal action for a person denied the right to participate in federally funded programs unless
the program funds have been cut off. 110 CONG. RIc. 2467 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Gill).
Similarly, Senator Kuchel noted that no remedy is provided for the victim of discrimination.
Id. at 6562 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
" 453 F. Supp. at 302-03. The Wilmington court noted that if the plaintiffs had alleged
a violation of a fundamental constitutional or federal right for which Congress had not created
a remedy, a remedy could be implied under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 453 F. Supp. at 303. See generally
Comment, New Damage Remedies for Violations of Constitutional Rights, 31 BAYLOR L. Rxv.
67 (1979).
11 453 F. Supp. at 302-05. The Wilmington court saw its reviewing function as limited to
TITLE VI
Reaching a result contrary to Wilmington, a federal district court in
New York recently held that a private right of action may be implied under
Title VI. In. Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of New
York (Guardians II),11 the plaintiffs, black and Hispanic New York City
policemen, brought a class action to challenge allegedly discriminatory
hiring and firing practices of the New York City Police Department. Like
the Wilmington court, the Guardians H court did not dwell on the Cort v.
Ash analysis.57 The district court rejected the idea that Title VI is essen-
tially administrative, arguing that individual actions for declaratory and
injunctive relief would not interfere with agency action." The statute pro-
vides only two methods of enforcement, voluntary compliance and fund
determining if agency action were "arbitrary and capricious" within the meaning of the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). 453 F. Supp. at 302-05. The court's
inquiry should be directed to whether agency procedures to adduce evidence were inadequate
as a matter of law. Id. at 304. The agency action is presumed valid, unless its decision were
not based on relevant factors or unless a clear error in judgment occurred. Id.
" 466 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In 1972 plaintiffs brought suit to challenge written
employment tests and height requirements of the New York City Police Department. Guardi-
ans Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. (Guardians I), No. 72-928 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The
district court denied a preliminary injunction, and the Second Circuit affirmed because of
the pending expiration of the eligibility lists based on these requirements. Guardians Ass'n.
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 490 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1973). In 1975, in response to a fiscal
crisis, the city laid off several policemen on a last hired-first fired basis. Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y. (Guardians H). 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (1979). The plaintiffs in
Guardians 1 prayed for an injunction reordering the police department's senority lists which
perpetuated the effects of the tests and height requirements beyond the effective date of Title
VII. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm' of N.Y., 431 F. Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The
Second Circuit vacated and remanded the district court's grant of an injunction for considera-
tion in light of International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Guardi-
ans Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977). On remand the
Guardians H court held that most, but not all, of the plaintiff class could recover under Title
VII. 466 F. Supp. at 1280.
Although Title VII did not originally apply to municipalities, it was amended by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to apply as of March 24, 1972. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(a). Thus, that portion of the plaintiff class hired before March 24, 1972 could not
recover under Title VII. 466 F. Supp. at 1280. The district court, therefore, examined the case
under Title VI, which applied as of 1964, to determine whether the remaining plaintiffs might
recover under that title. Id.
'1 466 F. Supp. at 1282. The Guardians H court mentioned Cort v. Ash in only one
paragraph which discussed Justice Stevens' concurrence in Bakke. Id.
0 Id. at 1284. While recognizing that relief available through agency channels is not
necessarily identical to that available through private suits, the Guardians H court rejected
the idea that the two are antagonistic. Fund termination is an approved remedy only in
agency actions; therefore, private actions would not necessarily disturb the fund termination
procedure. The administrative procedure is reserved for cases of last resort where the intensity
of opposition to change makes voluntary compliance impossible. Id.; see Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (declaratory judgment); Coates v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d
445, 449 (7th Cir. 1977) (declaratory judgment); Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801, 802-03 (4th
Cir. 1977) (injunction); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1148 (10th Cir. 1974)
(declaratory and injunctive relief). See also Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842 (D.
Neb. 1975) (plaintiff seeking money damages).
1980]
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termination. 9 Termination of federal funds, however, may not protect the
individual victim of discrimination, particularly in an isolated incident."0
The Guardians II court further concluded that Congress did not intend
to foreclose private suits to enforce section 601 rights." Although private
actions were expressly created in Titles II and VII, in both instances Con-
gress also established specific procedural prerequisites. 2 Therefore, failure
to expressly create a private right of action may indicate only that Con-
gress did not intend to establish similar procedural requirements for vindi-
cating Title VI rights. 3
While the lower federal courts were undecided on the propriety of
implying a private cause of action, the Supreme Court decided Cannon v.
University of Chicago.4 The plaintiff in Cannon claimed that certain ,age
requirements for admission to medical school operated to exclude women
from consideration.65 The Court's holding that a private right of action
existed under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197266 (Title IX)
was based on the legislative history indicating that Congress intended
Title IX to be enforced like Title VI, and that Congress believed Title VI
to encompass a private right of action. 7
" See text accompanying note 7 supra.
*' Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1284 (1979). See
generally, Note, Administrative Cutoff of Federal Funding under Title VI: A Proposed Inter-
pretation of "Program" 52 IND. L.J. 651 (1977).
£1 466 F. Supp. at 1283. In its analysis, the Guardians II court did not place much reliance
on the congressional comments, noting that "comments made in the heat of a floor debate
are not scholarly exercises in textual exegesis..Rather they are more or less intentional distor-
tions calculated to promote or inhibit the passage of a bill." Id.
11 Id. at 1282. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(d) (1976) (Title II), an individual may bring a
civil action to enforce the provisions of Title II, but the court has the option to refer the matter
to the Community Relations Service so long as the court believes there is a reasonable
possibility of obtaining voluntary compliance. Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) & 2000e-16(c) (1976) (Title VII), the right to bring a
private action under Title VII is contingent upon first bringing a timely claim before the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. For a discussion of "timely" under Title
VII, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1280 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).-See also Chambers v. Omaha Pub. School Dist., 536 F.2d 222, 225-27 (8th Cir. 1976)
(statute of limitations for Title VI actions).
13 466 F. Supp. at 1282. The Guardians If decision is noteworthy for the use made of Title
VI. The plaintiff class was seeking relief under Title VII to remedy past employment discrimi-
nation. Id. However, Title VII was not applicable to municipalities until March 24, 1972. Id.
at 1275. In comparison, Title VI contained no exception for municipalities, and applied from
the date of its passage in 1964. By allowing a cause of action under Title VI, the Guardians
II court was able to grant relief to the entire plaintiff class hired after the passage of the Act,
including those hired before March 24, 1972. Id. at 1285.
6, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
" Id. at 1949.
66 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Title IX's language creating rights and duties is substan-
tially similar to that of Title VI. The statute reads, in pertinent part, "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance . . ." Id.
67 99 S. Ct. at 1956-58 (1979). In analyzing the underlying statutory scheme of Title VI,
TITLE VI
The Cannon decision already has affected the outcome of several Title
VI cases. The Wilmington decision, which barred private plaintiffs from
the right to a trial de novo, has been reversed." The Wilmington court,
while basing its reversal on a Cort v. Ash analysis, 9 cited Cannon as
support for its holding." Furthermore, a federal district court recently has
cited Cannon as the Supreme Court authority for a private right of action
under Title VI.
7'
A secondary issue raised by the implication of a private right of action
is whether Title VI prohibits only intentional discrimination, or whether
the Cannon Court found two basic purposes for the statute. Id at 1961. One purpose was to
avoid using federal money to pay for discriminatory programs. The second purpose was to
protect individual citizens from discriminatory practices, a purpose which the Court felt
cannot be adequately carried out by agency procedures alone. Id. Comments in the Congres-
sional Record show that law suits were contemplated as a more efficient method of achieving
that purpose. See 110 CONG. REc. 7067 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff).
Furthermore, the Cannon majority stated that the private right of action issue had been
squarely decided in 1967 by the Fifth Circuit in Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d
847 (5th Cir. 1967). 99 S. Ct. at 1957. Other federal courts reached the same result in the
ensuing years. Id. The Court noted that private Title VI litigation has not been unduly costly
or voluminous. Id. at 1964. Furthermore, it rejected the argument that creation of express
private remedies in other sections of the Act precludes implication under Title VI. Id. at 1965.
Congress has passed other legislation which implies the existence of a private right of
action under Title VI. See 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (attorney's fees under the Emergency
School Aid Act); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)
(Civil Rights Attorneys Fee Awards Act of 1976). The legislative history of the Attorneys Fee
Awards Act shows that it was intended to authorize fees to reimburse private victims of
discrimination who have brought suit under the statutes listed in the Awards Act. The civil
rights laws listed therein were characterized as "depending heavily on private enforcement."
S. REP. No. 1011 94th Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in [1976] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5908-10.
The Cannon decision also found § 718 of the Education Amendments, 20 U.S.C. § 1617
(1976), persuasive evidence for the existence of a private right of action under Title VI. 99 S.
Ct. at 1959. Section 718 explicitly presumes that private suits are available to enforce Title
VI against educational agencies. Id. at 1958. See also Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier:
The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52 (1974).
* NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 1252-59.
70 Id. at 1256-57.
7, Brown v. New Haven Civ. Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Conn. 1979). The impact
of legitimizing private actions under Title VI probably will be felt predominantly in public
housing and public education. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (public educa-
tion); Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Auth,, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex.
1972) (public housing). Title VI is not generally used in employment discrimination cases
since most of these cases are covered by Title VII. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); note 65 supra. See generally, Developments in the Law
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 84 HARv. L. REv.
109 (1971).
Furthermore, plaintiffs turn to Title VI in unusual fact situations not covered by other
more specific titles of the Act. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(reverse discrimination); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382, 1384
(E.D. Va. 1972) (black seeking admission to whites-only country club built with proceeds
from federal loan).
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it also applies to facially neutral practices which have a discriminatory
impact." The Supreme Court has held that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 forbids practices with a discriminatory effect.3 Title VI does
not specify the standard to apply, although certain implementing regula-
tions under Title VI seem to mandate an effect standard.74 The Supreme
Court had indicated in Lau v. Nichols that facially neutral practices with
a discriminatory effect might violate Title VI.75 The Bakke court, however,
clearly stated that Title VI prohibits only racial classifications that would
violate the fifth amendment or the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment." The Court based this holding on the clear legislative
intent that the scope of Title VI's prohibition should be the same as that
of the Constitution.
7 7
A violation of constitutional dimensions of the prohibition against dis-
72 Some lower courts have required intentional discrimination by the defendant to consti-
tute a Title VI violation. See, e.g., Coates v. fllinois State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445, 449
(7th Cir. 1977); Gilliam v. City of Omaha, 388 F. Supp. 842, 848 (D. Neb.), affl'd, 524 F.2d
1013 (8th Cir. 1975). Other lower courts only require that plaintiffs show a course of conduct
which has a discriminatory effect. See, e.g., Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147,
1154 (10th Cir. 1974); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 539, 544
(C.D. Cal. 1974). See also Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories
of Constitutional Adjucication, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 36 (1977).
The Supreme Court itself had intimated the possibility that Title VI prohibited practices
with a discriminatory effect. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), upheld a Title VI charge of
discrimination in violation of H.E.W. implementing regulations which prohibit acts which
have the effect of discriminating against certain persons. Id. at 568; see note 74 infra. But
see, Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct. 363, 374 (1979).
71 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971). Title VII declares illegal any
unlawful employment practice which limits, classifies or segregates employees or applicants
in a way which deprives or tends to deprive an individual of employment opportunities
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976).
7' The HEW regulations implementing Title VI forbid recipients of federal funds from
providing to some individuals services or benefits which differ from those provided to other
under the program. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)(ii) (1979). Furthermore, the regulation forbids
recipients from restricting an individual's enjoyment of advantages or privileges enjoyed by
others receiving benefits under the program. Id.
Is 414 U.S. 563 (1974). The Lau Court found a violation of Title VI in a violation of the
HEW implementing regulation, 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b), promulgated under Title VI. 414 U.S.
at 568. This finding led other courts to find a violation of Title VI on the basis of discrimina-
tory impact alone. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F. Supp.
1273, 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Because this aspect of the Lau holding has been questioned in
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), Lau's precedential value is
unclear. See Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 716 (2d
Cir. 1979).
7' 438 U.S. at 287. Four Justices explicitly agreed with Justice Powell. Id. at 322 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring and dissenting).
" Id. at 285-87. Senator Ribicoff characterized Title VI as spelling out the procedure for
enforcing the constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of federal funds. 110
CONG. REc. 13,333 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff). Similarly Senator Humphrey stated that
the purpose of Title VI was to give citizens the rights and opportunities guaranteed by the
Constitution. Id. at 6553 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
TITLE VI
crimination requires a showing of an intentional plan or purpose," al-
though a discriminatory impact may be one factor in the totality of the
circumstances indicating a discriminatory intent. 9 Yet even an over-
whelming discriminatory effect will not invalidate an action if no discrimi-
natory intent or purpose can be shown."0
Despite the clear holding in Bakke that Title VI prohibits only those
actions that would violate the Constitution,8 ' subsequent treatment by the
lower courts has been varied. Some lower courts, basing their holdings on
two theories, continue to require only a showing of disproportionate im-
pact. One theory gives great deference to the implementing regulations
promulgated under Title VI which require only a showing of discriminatory
effect.5 ' Under the second theory, the lower courts look to the similarity
between Title VII and Title VI and hold that Congress intended that they
1s Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-43, 245 (1976). The plaintiff, in Davis chal-
lenged the validity of an employment qualification test which screened out a dispropor-
tionately high number of black applicants. Id. at 232-33. The disputed test measured verbal
ability, vocabulary, reading and comprehension. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia decided the case in favor of the petitioners on constitutional grounds alone. Id. at
236. Guided by Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), a Title VII case, the court of
appeals had found the lack of discriminatory intent irrelevant. 512 F.2d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The court held that disproportionate impact on black applicants was sufficient to
establish a constitutional violation, unless the defendants could show the test measured job
performance and future success. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the constitu-
tional standard for invidious discrimination was not identical with that of Title VII. Id. at
239.
7' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). An action does not violate the Constitu-
tion merely because it has a racially discriminatory impact. See Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977). A constitutional violation requires
a showing of racially discriminatory intent or purpose, although the discrimination need not
be the sole or even primary purpose of the action. Id. at 265. Plaintiffs may show discrimina-
tory intent through several kinds of circumstantial evidence, including disproportionate im-
pact and legislative history. Id.; see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,380-81 (1967) (sequence
of events leading to discriminatory action); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275-77 (1939)
(historical background of the decision constitutes adequate circumstantial evidence); Daley
v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (10th Cir. 1970) (departure from normal procedures
or substance indicates discriminatory intent). See also Comment, Proof of Racially Discrimi-
natory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. RXv. 725 (1977),
Note, Proving Discriminatory Intent from a Facially Neutral Decision with a Dispropor-
tionate Impact, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109 (1979).
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979). In Feeney, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its holdings in Davis and Arlington Heights and upheld a Massachusetts veterans
preference statute which operated to exclude virtually all women from high level civil service
jobs. The Court held that invidious purpose must be shown to make out a violation of
constitutional dimensions, regardless of the impact of the action. Id. at 2292-93. See also,
Keynes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973) (schools); Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, t6-57 (1964) (elections); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-07 (1945)
(jury selection).
" Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1979).
92 See text accompanying notes 83-86 infra.
13 See, e.g., Jackson v. Conway, 476 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mo. 1979); Caulfield v. Board of
Educ. of City of N.Y.. No. 77 C 2155 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1979).
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be enforced similarly. 4
Some lower courts, however, follow Bakke and require a showing of
discriminatory intent.u These courts consider the discriminatory impact
of a program's action to be a strong, but not conclusive, indication of
discriminatory intent. 6 In light of Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,7
which holds that the Constitution bars only intentional discrimination, the
approach of these courts seems to be the better one.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on whether a private
right of action may be implied under Title VI, the Court's decision in
Cannon v. University of Chicago indicates that the Court will hold a Title
VI private right exists if the question is properly before it. In addition, the
Court's decisions in the line of cases following Washington v. Davis suggest
the Court will require a finding of intentional discrimination to establish
a violation of Title VI.
REBECCA D. GRAvEs
8, See, e.g., Association Against Discrim. in Employment, Inc. v. City of BridgePort, 479
F. Supp. 101, 111 (D. Conn. 1979); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 466 F.
Supp. 1273, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The Guardians II court used the perceived similarity
between Title VI and Title VII to hold that the full range of Title VII relief is also available
under Title VI. Id. at 1284.
" See, e.g., Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 20 FAIR EMIL. PRAC. CAS. 1728 (6th
Cir. 1979); Parents Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 716 (2d
Cir. 1979); Brown v. New Haven Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1264 (D. Conn. 1979);
Otero v. Mesa County Valley School Dist., 470 F. Supp. 326, 330-31 (D. Colo. 1979).
u Most cases that regard discriminatory impact as evidence of intent involve litigation
over affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officer's Ass'n v. Young, 20 FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1728 (6th Cir. 1979).
" 99 S. Ct. 2882 (1979).
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